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Abstract 
 
Achieving the American dream is typically equated with strong upward socioeconomic mobility 
economic individualism, and low use of social assistance programs.  Immigrants migrating to the 
United States migrate for a variety of reasons; however, do they share perceptions of 
socioeconomic mobility and similar attitudes regarding social assistance?  And do the children 
and grandchildren of immigrants also share similar perceptions and attitudes? This study seeks to 
understand whether or not perceptions of socioeconomic mobility affect attitudes regarding 
social assistance in the immigrant first generation, second generation, and third generation.  By 
examining the core values and beliefs held by different immigrant generations, a pattern of 
perceptions of upward mobility and negative attitudes about assistance emerge in the first 
generation.  The quintessential American value of economic individualism appears to be a core 
value held by those coming from outside the borders of the United States and offers some 
explanation for the variation in assistance attitudes expressed by all generations. 
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Hard work and perseverance have long been considered the most important factors in achieving 
the American dream.  Discourses of American individualism and the possibility of positive 
socioeconomic mobility are powerful and commonplace in the United States today and are 
frequently cited as core American values.  Just as strong as a belief in positive mobility are the 
stories of America as a nation of immigrants.    Record numbers of immigrants are migrating to 
and naturalizing into the US seeking new opportunities for themselves and their children.  The 
impetus for migration is varied, though one factor that may draw immigrants to the U.S. is the 
appeal of social programs such as welfare, social security, and education.  Incentives to utilize 
the wide array of social assistance programs provided by state and federal governments are 
perceived to be a driving factor in immigration.  The question of whether or not immigrants 
utilize social assistance programs is a simple one: immigrants utilize welfare programs, and at a 
higher rate than native born Americans (Van Hook, 2003).  Regardless of utilization rates, 
support for social assistance programs must come from the American general public, of which 
new immigrants, their children, and eventually their grandchildren, are a part.  Do immigrants 
show support for or oppose social assistance policies and programs?  The ways in which 
perceptions of mobility affect support for social assistance are not fully known.  How do 
perceptions of socioeconomic mobility affect the willingness of an immigrant to show support 
for social assistance programs and do perceptions of mobility change between generations?   
 Since immigrants comprise a substantial and unique portion of the American population, 
and tend to be concentrated in certain regions and cities within the U.S., understanding why 
immigrants do, or do not, support the creation and funding of social assistance programs is 
valuable for the policy-making bodies to understand.  Within the United States first and second 
generation immigrants constitute over 15 percent of the eligible voting population, making the 
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American immigrant demographic extremely valuable to elected policy-makers (Ramakrishnan 
& Espenshade, 2001).  The number of immigrants migrating to the United States is not likely to 
decrease; if current rates of immigration remain consistent immigrant populations and their U.S. 
born children are projected to be an estimated 82 percent of the population increase of the United 
States in the next 40 years (Passel & Cohn, 2008).  In addition to the practical implications of 
understanding the motivations for social assistance support, the literature for these issues is 
sparse and ambivalent at best.  Literature on social assistance tends not to look at immigrant 
specific populations and only occasionally concentrates on the reasons for why support is shown 
for programs.  The relevant literature also tends to concentrate on different demographics within 
the immigrant population, and does not typically consider motivations behind behavior, but 
rather behavior only. Literature on immigrants and social assistance does not go much beyond 
utilization rates and the effects of “chilling out” noncitizen immigrants from various welfare 
programs (Van Hook, 2003).    
 First, second, and third generation immigrants will be considered when looking at 
attitudes about social assistance programs.  The behavior of a new or first generation immigrant 
is likely to vary greatly from that of their children, as the children of immigrants, or second 
generation immigrants, are both exposed to and more experienced with the American 
individualism discourse and the economic realities of day to day life within the US.  First 
generation immigrants are likely to be influenced by the motivations they felt to make their 
initial migration to the US.  Understanding these motivations sheds light on new immigrants’ 
perceptions of their ability to be successful within the US.  Newly naturalized immigrants are 
likely show a stronger belief in their ability to be upwardly mobile in the US economy and 
successive generations thereafter will show a decreasing belief in upward mobility.  Although a 
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strong sense of American individualism is likely to be instilled through a process of political and 
economic socialization to a greater degree in the second and third generations of an immigrant 
family, it is likely that the economic realities and the relative difficulty in achieving upward 
mobility will override feelings of individualism and mobility.  Generational differences in 
experiences with and perceptions of socioeconomic mobility situate this study and are the most 
significant variables to consider when looking at why immigrants may support or oppose social 
assistance.  Actual generational differences between immigrants are another place where the 
literature is ambivalent. Some studies suggest that there is significant difference, others suggest 
there is not, thus in an effort to clarify and hopefully add to the existing literature on immigrant 
behavior, the research questions for this study are as follows: 
Question1: Are perceptions of socioeconomic mobility in immigrant 
populations significantly different from those of native born Americans, 
and if so, do generational differences in immigrants decrease or increase a 
perceived belief in upward socioeconomic mobility? 
Question2: Does a perception of upward socioeconomic mobility explain 
low support for social assistance programs? 
Literature Review 
Generation can be defined in a variety of ways, though in the context of this study, generation 
should be understood in genealogical terms: the second and third generations are the children and 
grandchildren of individuals not born in the United States.  The first generation is the first 
generation of their families to live in the United States.  The literature does not agree about the 
effects of generation on political attitudes, feelings about socioeconomic mobility, or core values 
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as they are transferred and differ between generations.  Several scholars argue that there is 
considerable difference between immigrant generations and specifically the difference between 
generations can shape political attitudes and core values, as well as create significant variation in 
perceptions of socioeconomic mobility.  Other scholars argue that there are core values that do 
not differ between generations that shape political attitudes and perceptions of mobility.   
The first portion of the literature review argues that generation has a significant effect on 
shaping ideas about socioeconomic mobility and social assistance.  The second section of the 
literature review, however, shows that there is extensive literature that suggests that many beliefs 
which appear to be ideological or generational, such as ideas about socioeconomic mobility and 
social assistance are actually shaped by a set of core values and beliefs. Core values and beliefs 
are shared by members of a common culture.  Immigrants, their children, and grandchildren are 
very much a part of the larger American culture in many ways.  Since the first section of the 
literature review argues that generation plays a role in the degree to which immigrants share 
American values and ideals, we should first examine how shared values such as economic 
individualism and dreams of upward socioeconomic mobility have been previously studied. 
Values are defined as “conceptions of the desirable” that serve as guiding social norms, are used 
to evaluate people and events, and are “trans-situational criteria or goals…ordered by importance 
as guiding principles in life” (Schwartz, 1999: 24-25).Values are shared socially and are useful in 
understanding how individual political attitudes are structured (Feldman, 2003).  Economic 
individualism is an example of a shared core value that is arguably one of the most important in 
the United States.  Economic individualism plays a role in both the desire for upward social 
mobility and social assistance (Feldman, 2003; Feldman, 1988; Markus, 2001; Shen & Edwards, 
2005).   
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Economic individualism is linked to social mobility and support for a market economy 
which shapes the way people respond to social assistance programs (Feldman, 2003).  Since 
economic individualism is defined by an individual’s belief that people are ultimately 
responsible for their own mobility, individuals who express strong feelings of individualism are 
not likely to strongly support social assistance programs.  Society is not responsible for those 
who are in need when core social values dictate strong feelings of individualism (Feldman, 
2003).  There is some disagreement about how much of an effect individualism has on social 
assistance attitudes.  Individualism may not entirely determine attitudes about assistance 
programs as Feldman argues.  Even when an individual has strong perceptions of mobility and 
individualistic attitudes, people are still capable of understanding that some circumstances are 
beyond the control of the individual and thus may still show some acceptance for social 
assistance (Markus, 2001).  The literature on core values is not completely clear; however, the 
existence of an effect by core social values should not be ignored.  As the next section addresses, 
generation may contribute to some of the ambiguity regarding how core values dictate attitudes 
and feelings.   
Generational Determinants of Mobility Perceptions and Assistance Attitudes 
First, second, and third generation immigrants experience very different processes of 
political and economic socialization, although the degree to which socialization differs and the 
effects upon policy that it has is not clear.  The ways in which different processes of political and 
economic socialization affect immigrants’ perceptions of themselves and their ability to move 
within the strata of the American economic system are likely influenced by generational status.  
Younger, American-born generations, in comparison to their older, foreign-born counterparts are 
more likely to participate politically and vote.  Since “the life experiences of the younger, native-
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born sectors have socialized them to a stronger belief in American civic norms” and “the same 
norms have not been reinforced in the older, foreign-born cohort”, attitudes supportive of social 
assistance programs may also be stronger in the younger generation (Tam Cho, 1999: 1153).  
This section of the literature review will address  the literature that posits a generational effect on 
feelings of mobility and assistance attitudes. 
Characteristics of the First Generation 
There are a variety of characteristics that make first generation immigrants different from 
second generation immigrants.  In addition to differences in perceptions of socioeconomic 
mobility, first generation immigrants also utilize their social networks within the US differently.  
A first generation immigrant’s country of origin may also play a significant role in their feelings 
about social assistance policies that result in programs.  Looking first at mobility, we see that 
motivations for immigration are frequently based on the belief that increased socioeconomic 
mobility will be greatly increased through an act of migration, although this perception 
frequently does not reflect the economic reality of living in the United States.  Within the US, 
there is a discrepancy between beliefs about socioeconomic mobility and the reality of 
socioeconomic mobility: there is a “common and persistent perception of the United States as an 
exceptionally mobile society” (Benabou & Tirole, 2004: 5).  Strong feelings of economic 
individualism may not reflect the economic or political reality of immigrants living in the United 
States. 
Establishing that a new migrant to the United States perceives themselves as upwardly 
mobile is important to explaining the causal mechanisms that help to determine whether or not a 
first generation migrant is likely to support social assistance programs.  For first generation 
immigrants, migrations may occur because of economic factors: prospects of brighter futures and 
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a more comfortable lifestyle are forceful conceptions in the decision to migrate.  Since the initial 
act of migration is made by a first generation immigrant, the act of migration itself is indicative 
of strong perceptions of upward mobility within the US economic strata.  The traditional 
argument for migration is one of better jobs in the United States, with migrants seeking to escape 
poverty and unemployment in their home countries, and diversify their economic risks (Massey 
et al.,1993: 436).  Diversification of risks through migration is not the only reason for migration.  
The strong influence of westernized lifestyles, or an increase in the comfort of lifestyle for a 
migrant that has a post high school or post collegiate degree, are also common reasons for 
migration; not all “immigrants...come to escape perennial unemployment or destitution in their 
homeland.  Most undertake the journey instead to attain the dream of a new lifestyle that has 
reached their countries but that is impossible to fulfill in them” (Portes & Rumbaut, 2006: 19). 
Not all migrants are poverty stricken or unemployed in their home country, in fact 
“migration is the means to stabilize family livelihoods and meet long-desired 
aspirations…contemporary immigration is a direct consequences of the dominant influence 
attained by the culture of the advanced West in every corner of the globe” (Portes & Rumbaut, 
2006: 19). Pursuit of an Americanized lifestyle, which has strong roots in consumption and the 
free market is a powerful force for today’s migrants.  “The enormous variety of today’s 
immigrants and the fact that they come spontaneously, rather than through recruitment, reflect 
the attraction of American lifestyles and their gradual conversion into a world standard” (Portes 
& Rumbaut, 2006: 19).  Migrants come to the US for a chance to increase their socioeconomic 
mobility, and as such, perceptions of this mobility would be relatively high for the first 
generation of immigrants.   
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Another illustration of strong perceptions of economic mobility is the dreams migrants 
have for their children, the second generation.  Ambitions and expectations for the second 
generation, especially in the realm of higher education also show that migrants perceive 
themselves and their children to have the ability to be highly mobile.  Close to 74 percent of 
immigrant “parents expect their children to graduate from college, and of these, close to 50 
percent expect them to earn a postgraduate degree; majorities of all immigrant nationalities voice 
these goals” (Portes & Rumbaut, 2001: 103).  Strong perceptions of socioeconomic mobility are 
indicative of low support for social assistance.  Perceiving one’s self to be self sufficient and as 
having the opportunities to increase income and consumption power suggests one would be less 
likely to seek out and support programs that do not encourage the strong sense of American 
individualism that often motivates immigrants to migrate.  Whether it is through motivations for 
migration, or the dreams of a parent for their child, migrants perceive themselves to have more 
opportunities in the US than in their home countries.  The ways in which these perceptions 
manifest themselves in the actions of migrants for or against issues of social assistance is the 
reasoning for this study. 
After migrating, immigrants frequently join a community of immigrants from a common 
country or region of origin.  By joining with a community, immigrants can be exposed to certain 
types of social assistance which may not necessarily reflect all of the programs available.  The 
types of programs that first generation migrants are exposed to may or may not reflect their 
preferences and support for social assistance, and as will be addressed in the following section on 
second generation immigrants, likely influence their children.  Newly arrived immigrants are 
likely to utilize the same type of assistance as those immigrants who arrived prior to them.  This 
“suggests that there are information networks operating within ethnic communities which 
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transmit information about the availability of particular types of benefits to newly arrived 
immigrants” (Borjas & Hilton, 1996: 602).Information networks within specific communities 
may bias an immigrant towards one form of social assistance over another, and it may also 
influence an immigrant to support or oppose entire social assistance policies.  Both perceptions 
of mobility and the influence of social networks can help to explain the feelings an immigrant 
has about social assistance.   
Processes of socialization, experience with assistance, and community networks are all 
based on the type of country from which an immigrant originated.  Political and economic 
experiences from the country of origin are elements of life that an immigrant or the child of an 
immigrant has to cope with when trying to integrate into the American mainstream.  Since 
children of immigrants spend more time in the United States, in comparison to their parents, it is 
reasonable to conclude that first generation immigrants will retain stronger political and 
economic ties to their country of origin (Ramakrishnan & Espenshade, 2001).  Not all 
immigrants utilize or seek out assistance benefits in the same fashion either. Immigrant welfare 
utilization rates vary significantly according to country of origin (Borjas& Trejo, 1993).  Welfare 
utilization rates for specific populations of the immigrants in the United States can be accounted 
for when looking at country of origin, and increases in welfare utilization in the 1980s correlate 
directly with the changes in immigrant source countries for that same period (Borjas & Trejo, 
1993).  After migration some immigrants will also continue to participate socially in the politics 
and economics of their sending countries, keeping strong ties in the political areas they were 
previously active (Guarnizo et al., 2003).  Forms of government and types of social assistance 
provided in a home country are likely to influence first generation immigrants’ impressions 
Valuing Individualism    Alyssa Paylor   
 
12 
 
about social assistance, and the policies of home countries should be less influential as 
generations spent outside of the home country increase.  
Characteristics of the Second Generation 
Second generation immigrants are born in the US, therefore their experiences within the 
US will be substantially different from their parents.  The literature shows that second generation 
immigrants have different experiences with economic mobility than their parents, they utilize 
and view their social networks in a different fashion, and country of origin plays almost no role 
in their perceptions of their own mobility or in their feelings about social assistance.  Although 
the second generation has a greater exposure to discourses on American individualism, their 
actual experiences with minimal or no upward mobility frequently override these discourses 
(Zhou, 1997).  As was discussed in the section on first generation characteristics, there is a 
discrepancy regarding socioeconomic mobility within the US.  The discrepancy between 
perceptions of and experience with mobility are reflected in the attitudes of second generation 
immigrants.  Because their experiences with mobility differ from the perceptions of their parents, 
their perceptions of their own potential to be mobile are also different.  Economic disadvantage 
among immigrant youth in the second generation leads to feelings of frustration about the 
widening gap between American mainstream culture, which places high values on freedom and 
materialism, and the reality of a dwindling economic future (Zhou, 1997).  As a response to this 
frustration, many immigrant youth are beginning to reject the goals of achievement and upward 
mobility that are so prevalent in their parent’s generation (Zhou, 1997).  Although many 
immigrants follow a traditional bottom-up route of socioeconomic mobility, some new arrivals 
have merged directly into the American middle class, bypassing the very bottom of the 
socioeconomic bracket.  The implications for the children of these immigrants are significant 
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because “the current state and future prospects of immigrant children are related to the 
advantages or disadvantages that accrue to the socioeconomic status of their parents” (Zhou, 
1997).  Generational difference, and differences between perceptions of and the reality of 
socioeconomic mobility are likely to be highly influential on a migrant’s or their children’s 
willingness to show support for social assistance.  
Essentially, mobility experiences are important because if first generation immigrants 
come to the United States perceiving themselves to be more mobile than they actually are, their 
children’s experience with mobility will be less reflective of their parent’s perceptions, and more 
reflective of the reality of economic mobility in the United States. Thus, second generation 
immigrants will be more willing to support social assistance based on their experience with 
socioeconomic mobility rather than based on the prevailing American discourse of upward 
mobility.  
 As a complement to experiences with mobility, social networks for second generation 
immigrants are expected to have a strong effect on individual values and perceptions (Kwak, 
2003).Individual values and political attitudes may be mitigated when someone has benefited 
from social programs, or when they have known someone close to them who has benefited from 
assistance.  Knowing someone who was the recipient of assistance increases the likelihood of 
supporting policies with social benefits (Appelbaum, 2001). This is supportive of the idea that 
contact with people who are in need of assistance increases positive feelings towards other 
people in need of assistance.  The existence of networks will be especially significant to second 
generation immigrants, because of the overwhelming affect experiences with socioeconomic 
mobility are expected to have on the second generation.  Assuming that second generation 
immigrants experience low levels of socioeconomic mobility, as is argued by Zhou (1997), the 
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likelihood that second generation immigrants come into contact with assistance programs is high.  
Since second generation immigrants have a higher likelihood of encountering recipients of 
assistance due to a longer time spent in the United States the social network variable is likely to 
have a strong effect on second generation immigrants and a weak effect on first generation 
immigrants.  Finally, in an effort to break a cycle of disadvantage and social inequality, young 
first generation and second generation immigrants attempt to cultivate relationships within their 
ethnic communities which can provide potential avenues for upward mobility (Zhou, 1997).  
Through the cultivation of these relationships, second generation immigrants may have an easier 
time accessing and understanding the benefits of social assistance programs. 
The Role of the Welfare State 
Understanding how welfare programs relate to immigrants is important and relate closely to the 
motivations for migration experience by the first generation.  Common misconceptions about 
motivations for migration to the United States include the potential draw of a strong welfare 
state.  Proponents of stricter immigration control frequently cite the draw of the United States’ 
welfare programs for incoming immigrant populations (Van Hook, 2003; Borjas, 1999).  “From 
the individual’s point of view the major effect of welfare state policies is partial protection from 
and modification of, market-mediated rules of inclusion in the economic system” (Halfmann, 
2000: 41).  Immigrants are accused of seeking out state protection in the form of welfare and 
empirical evidence suggests that immigrants tend to congregate in states where welfare benefits 
are the highest (Borjas, 1999).  This trend, however, could be a result of other variables, such as 
strong ties to specific immigrant communities.   After migrating, immigrants seek inclusion into 
American mainstream culture regardless of whether or not they are naturalized citizens.  Welfare 
politics frequently seek to exclude immigrant populations from the protection of welfare 
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programs and inclusion into the welfare state (Halfmann, 2000).  Ethnocentric perceptions of 
immigrants as a drain on social assistance programs has been a driving force in welfare 
legislation politics.    
Welfare legislation in 1996 sought to exclude non-citizen immigrants from participating 
in welfare programs, partly as a means of discouraging immigration and partly as a means of 
reducing state expenditures on welfare programs (Borjas, 1999; Van Hook, 2003).  Prior to the 
1996 welfare reform legislation, non-citizen welfare recipients initially had much lower 
naturalization levels than non-welfare recipients, which suggests that welfare was a disincentive 
to naturalization; however this gap closed by 1998.  After the passage of 1996 welfare 
legislation, both recipients and non-recipients of welfare were equally as likely to naturalize 
(Van Hook, 2003).  This finding suggests that incentives for naturalization for a non-citizen 
migrant are neither predicated on their desires to continue utilizing the welfare system nor was 
welfare utilization necessarily a driving force in the decision to migrate.  Inclusion into 
American culture and in the context of the United States where the nation state as a welfare state 
is actually fairly limited, ideas of nationalism must instead come from “substitutes and 
supporting ideologies—a civil religion, the belief in certain uniquely American virtues—for 
creating and maintaining a nation” (Halfmann, 2000; 45).  Inclusion may come in the form of 
shared cultural ideas and values such as individualism, but these ideas and values are likely 
influenced and differ by generation, given some of the unique generational attributes such as 
migration, networks, and actual experience with socioeconomic mobility and social assistance 
programs. 
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Non-Generational Determinants of Mobility Perceptions and Assistance Attitudes 
Generation is arguably a very broad measure incapable of accounting for the enormous 
differences in immigrant populations.  David Kertzer argues that there are a numerous 
problematic reasons in using generational analysis as a determinant of any sort of political or 
ideological difference between individuals (Kertzer, 1983).  First and foremost, Kertzer warns of 
the erroneous assumption that an intergenerational study of any sort can account for forms of 
value transmission between generations.  As is the case with this study, comparisons of values 
between generations are being made, however according to Kertzer, this is cannot be done unless 
the respondents are related and in this case they are not (Kertzer, 1983).Additionally, the creation 
of categories based broadly on just three genealogical generations is problematic because of the 
vast variation in the location from which migrants come and the difference in historical time 
period at the time of their migration (Kertzer, 1983).  While Kertzer’s arguments are valid, part 
of the tested variables within this study will consider the countries and regions from which 
migrants originate.  Finally, the vast variation in age and in age of arrival to the US for the first 
generation will create a variety of differences within each generational category (Kertzer, 1983).  
As is the case with taking countries and regions of origin into account, age is also statistically 
accounted for in this study.  Kertzer’s arguments offer a solid base for many other important 
ideas about how core values, political attitudes, and perceptions of mobility are created in all 
people, not just those who are immigrants or those who fall into a single generational category 
 The relevant literature as it relates to immigrants and social assistance is very sparse, 
therefore the following sections describing social assistance attitudes are not specific to 
immigrants as a demographic.  Just as economic individualism is upheld as core value closely 
linked to mobility, other core values exist in tandem with individualism.  The following section 
is useful in highlighting how some scholars believe a person conceptualizes inequality and 
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poverty and how they believe these problems should be remedied, which is often dictated by 
their core values.  Humanitarianism and egalitarianism are two core values that can shape a 
person’s attitudes about social assistance.  Income, political ideology, and the importance of core 
values are covered in the following sections as being alternative explanations to generational 
effects on mobility and assistance attitudes. 
 Assuming that an individual’s income will influence his or her feelings for providing 
support to another individual whose income is inadequate is a logical conclusion to draw; the 
literature, however, does not necessarily agree about how income affects attitudes about giving 
assistance. On one side of the argument, Appelbaum suggests that individuals with low incomes 
are less likely to support social assistance than those with higher incomes since “it is possible 
that people with low incomes feel that if they can survive without aid, then others should be able 
to provide for themselves as well” (Appelbaum, 2001: 431).  On the other side of the 
income/assistance debate,  Picketty finds that the majority of lower income voters who were born 
into a low income will vote for liberal policies, however, low income voters who were born into 
middle incomes will not (Piketty, 2005).  Finally, Picketty finds that parent’s income history also 
affects attitudes about social assistance as much as one’s own income, however, in this study, 
opposite findings are expected because perceptions of socioeconomic mobility in second 
generation immigrants will be a stronger determinant of assistance attitudes than income.  Thus, 
although the literature does not agree on how income affects assistance attitudes, first generation 
immigrants are expected to follow the arguments presented by the first author, Appelbaum; 
where first generation immigrants exhibit low levels of social assistance support, based on the 
their own experiences with low socioeconomic mobility and low income.  Second and third 
generation immigrants are likely to follow the arguments presented by Piketty; where they show 
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more support than the first generation for social assistance based on the low income histories of 
their parents. 
 Many attitudes regarding assistance are in part a product of a person’s political ideology.  
A strong indicator of support for assistance is the perception of a person’s adherence to 
traditional norms.  Conservatives view violators of traditional norms to be in need of punishment 
and are morally outraged by violations, while liberals do not.  Skitka and Tetlock identify what 
they call the trade-off avoidance hypothesis.  The trade-off avoidance hypothesis shows that 
liberals find it to be emotionally difficult and distasteful to make individual resource allocation 
decisions. Liberals would rather expand a resource pool (to help those perceived to not to be 
responsible for their predicament) at personal expense than distinguish between one person’s 
need over another (Skitka & Tetlock, 1993).  Rudolph and Evans provide an overview of the 
concept stating that “not surprisingly… support for government spending is greater among 
Democrats and liberals than it is among Republicans and conservatives” (Rudolph & Evans, 
2005: 666).  Thus, attributions of poverty and consequently attitudes about providing assistance 
to another person may be strongly determined by that individual’s political ideology. 
Alternatively, conservatives engage in what Skitka and Tetlock have termed the self-
interest hypothesis; where conservatives are unwilling to expand a resource pool to increase 
social assistance when expanding resources comes at a personal expense.  However, when 
resources are scarce, both liberals and conservatives denied social assistance to those people they 
deemed personally responsible for their own predicament.  Under conditions of resource scarcity 
and abundance, conservatives are more likely to withhold various forms aid from those they 
consider to be in violation of traditional norms, which Skitka and Tetlock call the Punitiveness 
hypothesis.    When resources are abundant, liberals and conservatives fall back into the behavior 
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noted prior, with liberals providing assistance to everyone and conservatives continuing to 
withhold assistance to those perceived as responsible for their predicament.  Conservatives tend 
to withhold assistance consistently, across both resource scarcity and abundance (Skitka & 
Tetlock, 1993).  Liberals tend to withhold assistance in a more contextual sense, and really only 
withhold assistance when resources are scarce and recipients are perceived a personally 
responsible for their need.  Ideology can be a powerful determinant in understanding how one 
behaves politically although frequently, ideology is really just a reflection of an individual’s core 
beliefs and values (Feldman, 2003) 
In addition to ideology and income, the core values of humanitarianism and 
egalitarianism can help to predict a person’s attitudes about assistance.   Individuals who seek to 
rectify worldwide inequalities through social assistance programs are egalitarians.  Egalitarians 
will more strongly support government assistance programs than humanitarians because they 
perceive government action to be the most effective remedy to world inequalities (Feldman & 
Steenbergen, 2001).Alternatively, humanitarians will support social assistance only when they 
perceive the recipient’s neediness to be no fault of their own.  “Most individuals feel a strong 
need to believe that they live in a world that is just, in the sense that people generally get what 
they deserve, and deserve what they get” (Benabou & Tirole, 2004: 1; Alesina & Angeletos, 
2005). A belief in a just world reflects strongly egalitarian values, however, when people 
combine a belief of a just world with the belief that individuals are responsible for their own 
poverty, believing in a just world rarely leads to support for social assistance (Lane, 2001). From 
a humanitarian’s perspective, viewing someone as responsible for their own poverty or neediness 
will not lead to strong support for assistance programs.   
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Individual views on why and how someone came to need assistance are vastly different 
and reflective of core values.  The way people understand income inequality affects the way they 
understand poverty and directly contributes to whether or not they choose egalitarianism or 
humanitarianism as a core value.  If a person does not perceive income inequality to be an issue, 
as an egalitarian would, they are much less likely to support policies to alleviate it, making them 
a humanitarian.  For an egalitarian, support for social assistance policies is based on perceptions 
of the fairness of market outcomes and the underlying sources of income inequality (Feldman & 
Steenbergen, 2001).  Humanitarianism looks instead at whether or not a person is responsible for 
their own poverty.  Individualism as a core value is compatible with and frequently accompanies 
humanitarianism to make a set of core values.  In the case of the United States, humanitarianism 
and individualism can accompany each other and “American’s believe that poverty is due to bad 
choices or lack of effort…Americans perceive wealth and success as the outcome of individual 
talent, effort, and entrepreneurship” (Alesina & Angeletos, 2005: 960).  In support of this 
finding, only a minority of Americas, 20 percent, believe that poverty is entrapping and only 30 
percent believe that luck, rather than effort or education, determines income (Benabou & Tirole, 
2004).   
Allocating assistance for those who are impoverished is often done based on an 
attribution of poverty; whether or not an individual’s poverty is caused by internal 
(humanitarianism) or external factors (egalitarianism).  Attributions of poverty accompany 
individualism when a person decides whether or not to support assistance programs, although 
there is a tension between egalitarianism and individualism that does not exist for 
humanitarians.“Sixty percent of Americans…believe that the poor could become rich if they just 
tried hard enough,” indicating that most Americans attribute poverty to internal sources; lack of 
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education, lack of determination, etc., rather than external, circumstantial sources (Alesina & 
Angeletos, 2005: 960).  When poverty is attributed to internal rather than external sources, a 
humanitarian views the person in need of assistance more negatively (Appelbaum, 2001; Lane, 
2001).  The core values of humanitarianism and egalitarianism are linked to political ideology, 
“conservatives blame poverty on self-indulgence and lack of moral standards and intelligences.  
Liberals see the poor as victims of unjust social practices and structures” (Skitka and Tetlock, 
193: 1205).  Assistance attitudes are strongly based in the core values of individualism and 
humanitarianism or egalitarianism. 
Argument and Hypothesis 
 
As immigrants are socialized politically and economically over successive generations, factors 
such as core values, ideology, and perceptions of mobility influence their understanding of and 
support for specific programs.  The most significant variables in this study are going to be 
generational difference between immigrants and their perceptions of socioeconomic mobility.  
Portes and Rumbaut argue that “despite efforts of immigrant families and sending-country 
governments to preserve vibrant national loyalties among the second generation, the process of 
acculturation inexorably turns their members into Americans with primarily domestic views and 
aspirations” (Portes and Rumbaut, 2006: 147).  As a result of change over time, different 
immigrant generations are likely to support or oppose social programs in different ways.  The 
following are hypothesis to each of the research questions presented: 
Hypothesis1: First generation immigrants will perceive themselves to be 
more upwardly mobile than native born Americans, with successive 
generations exhibiting perceptions of less upward mobility 
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Hypothesis2: Perceptions of upward mobility will be indicative of low 
support for social assistance programs. 
Generational status is expected to be a good predictor of whether or not an immigrant will 
support the allocation of assistance, based on perceived socioeconomic mobility.  As 
generational status changes from first to second, and second to third; perceptions of mobility are 
likely to decrease, resulting in an increased support for social assistance.   If first generation 
migrants come to the United States perceiving themselves to be more economically successful 
then they could be in their home country, then migrants would be less likely to show support for 
social assistance, because if they themselves can successful, than other people should be able to 
do the same.  The influential discourse of economic individualism is expected to be very strong 
for first generation immigrants and show diminishing in importance for successive generations. 
Data and Methods 
The 2006 General Social Survey (GSS) constitutes the data set for this study.  Since 1994 the 
GSS has been a biannual survey conducted by the National Opinion Research Center (NORC).  
The GSS is the longest running NORC project, with its inaugural survey conducted in 1972.  The 
GSS is funded by the Sociology Program of the National Science Foundation and in 2006 it had 
a total of 4505 respondents.  Survey results from the GSS are analyzed and utilized by a variety 
of public and private academic institutions, government agencies, nonprofits, and private 
corporations.  Second only to the Census, the GSS is one of the most frequently analyzed  
surveys conducted in the United States.   
Variables 
Four different groups of individuals were established: first generation, second generation, third 
generation, and the four-plus generation.  For the purposes of this study, first generation 
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represents anyone who was born outside of the United States.  The second generation requires 
that a person is born in the United States and has one or both parents born outside of the United 
States.  The third generation requires that a person is born in the United States, that both parents 
are born in the United States and that one or more grandparent is born outside of the United 
States.  The fourth-plus generation encompasses everyone born in the United States who have 
both parents born in the United States, have all grandparents born in the United States, and may 
or may not have one or more great-grandparent born outside of the United States.  Establishing 
generation beyond and including the fourth generation was not possible based on the lineage 
questions asked by GSS 2006.  In 2006, GSS respondents were asked whether or not they were 
born in the United States, how many parents were born in the United States, and how many 
grandparents were born in the United States.  Based on these questions, the total of all 
respondents who qualified as first generation were 417, 14 percent of the sample; second 
generation respondents totaled 249, 8 percent of the sample; third generation respondents totaled 
580, 20 percent of the sample; and the fourth-plus generation totaled 1,642, 58 percent of the 
sample.  It should be noted that not all respondents answered all the questions pertaining to their 
lineage, therefore each generational category, including the four-plus generation, is based on 
only those who answered enough or all of the questions regarding their own status, the status 
their parents, and the status of their grandparents to place them into one of the available 
categories.   
 After generation, the most important variable to this study is a measure of perceived 
socioeconomic mobility.  For all tables and graphs, this variable is referred to as “feelings of 
mobility”.  On the 2006 GSS respondents were asked, “The way things are in America, people 
like me and my family have a good chance of improving our standard of living. Do you agree or 
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disagree?”  Agreement or disagreement was based on a five point scale: 1 strongly disagree, 2 
disagree, 3 neither agree nor disagree, 4 agree, 5 strongly agree.  This categorical variable 
represents a measure of perceived socioeconomic mobility and is used in all models.  Perceived 
socioeconomic mobility is both an outcome variable and an explanatory variable, depending on 
the model being discussed.  Clarification of how the “feelings of mobility” variable is used will 
be covered in the discussion of the models later in this section.  
 The primary outcome variable of this study is a measurement of attitudes regarding the 
amount of money being spent on social assistance programs.  This variable is referred to as 
“assistance attitudes” for all tables and graphs.  The “assistance attitudes” variable is comprised 
of three questions from GSS 2006.  These questions ask the respondent’s opinion about whether 
or not the government is spending too much, about right, or too little on welfare, social security, 
and education.   Generating a measure of opinions regarding spending on social assistance was 
done by scaling these three questions (welfare, social security, and education) into one variable.  
Spending is a reasonable measure of support for social assistance because it indicates that when 
spending is too low the respondent would be willing to spend more through a possible increase in 
taxes or a reallocation of government funding from one program to another.  Thus, opinions on 
spending indicate whether or not a person supports a given set of programs.  Welfare and social 
security are obvious examples of social assistance, while education is more abstract.  Education 
was included as part of the “assistance attitudes” variable because the original GSS asked about 
education as part of the set that included questions on welfare and social security spending. 
Other variables of interest include respondent’s country of origin, political views, 
education, income, socioeconomic index, sex, and age.  Two different country of origin variables 
were created from the same question and differ by the categories available within each.  Country 
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of origin by HDI is a variable comprised of four categories, each one representing a Human 
Development Index (HDI) rating: low development, medium development, high development, 
and very high development.  Country of origin by region breaks respondents’ country of origin 
into the following world regional categories: North America (excluding the US), Western 
Europe, Eastern Europe, Central America, South America, Asia, Africa, and the United States.  
For a more extensive discussion of how the country of origin variables were created, the exact 
wording of the question, and the countries placed into each category, please see Appendix A.  
The political views variable ranges from extremely conservative to extremely liberal.  Education 
measures the highest completed year of school; some high school, high school graduate, some 
college, college graduate, post graduate.  Finally, for more information regarding the breakdown 
of income and socioeconomic index, age, and education please see Appendix A.  
Models 
Two linear regression models are used to examine the relationship between immigrant 
generation, perceived socioeconomic mobility, and support for social assistance programs.  The 
first model is based on hypothesis1; that there is a difference in perceptions of socioeconomic 
mobility between immigrant generations.  This first model, the Generational Mobility model, 
examines the effect of generational difference on perceptions of mobility.  This model looks at 
mobility perceptions for first, second, third, and four-plus generations.  The Generational 
Mobility model is used to establish the relationship between immigrant generation and perceived 
socioeconomic mobility over other factors such as country/region of origin, income, 
socioeconomic index, political views, education, and other demographic variables.  The second 
model is based on hypothesis2; that perceived mobility will have an effect on attitudes regarding 
social assistance programs.  Model two, the Assistance Attitudes model, examines the effect of 
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perceived mobility and generation on attitudes about social assistance programs over 
demographic variables and the above mentioned variables of interest.   
In the Generational Mobility model, perceived socioeconomic mobility is the outcome 
variable and results from this model help to establish the existence of a relationship between 
generation and perceptions of mobility.  In the Assistance Attitudes model, mobility is an 
explanatory variable and is tested against the outcome variable, assistance attitudes.  In the 
Assistance Attitudes model, the relationship between generation and assistance attitudes is first 
tested, with perceived mobility introduced as an explanatory variable.  The introduction of 
perceived mobility to the Assistance Attitudes model tests the mediating effect of perceived 
mobility on the relationship between immigrant generation and assistance attitudes over other 
variables.               
Results and Analysis 
The Generational Mobility model addresses the first research question and hypothesis; on the 
issue of socioeconomic mobility, are there unique differences in perceptions of socioeconomic 
mobility between immigrants of different generations?  The first generation over all other 
generations is expected to show the strongest perception of upward socioeconomic mobility 
because migrating to the United States suggests that an individual perceives themselves to have 
greater opportunities in the United States compared to in their home country.  Figure 1 is a cross-
tabulation analysis of the relative feelings of mobility within each generation.  Within the first 
generation, over 70 percent either agree or strongly agree that they have the potential for positive 
social mobility and less than 10 percent believe they do not have the potential for upward 
socioeconomic mobility.  Cross-tabulation analysis cannot provide a full picture of why a first 
generation immigrant may perceive themselves as being upwardly mobile, nor can it make 
Valuing Individualism    Alyssa Paylor   
 
27 
 
meaningful comparisons between the generations compared to the fourth-plus generation.  
Multivariate linear regression analysis of mobility feelings shows differences between 
generational perceptions of mobility, along with other explanatory variables that have an effect 
on feelings of mobility.  Much of the statistical analysis is based on beta coefficients for each 
regression, therefore a table of the beta coefficients for the Generational Mobility model can be 
viewed in Appendix B.  
 
Figure 1           Feelings of Mobility by Generation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Key: 
Frequency 
Row Percentage 
Column Percentage 
 
 
 
          
Feelings of     
Mobility 
First 
Generation 
Second 
Generation 
Third 
Generation 
Fourth-Plus 
Generation Total 
Strongly Disagree 7 7 9 29 52 
13.46 13.46 17.31 55.77 100.00 
2.42 4.40 2.58 2.64 2.74 
Disagree  22 20 69 153  264 
8.33 7.58 26.14 57.95 100.00 
7.61 12.58 19.77 13.92 13.92 
Neither  34 23 59 171 287 
11.85 8.01 20.56 59.58  100.00 
11.76 14.47 16.91 15.56 15.14 
Agree  133 75 141 548 897 
14.83 8.36 15.72 61.09  100.00 
46.02 47.17 40.40 49.86 47.31 
Strongly Agree  93 34 71  198 396 
23.48 8.59 17.93 50.00 100.00 
32.18 21.38 20.34 18.02 20.89 
Total 289   159 349  1,099  1,896 
 15.24 8.39  18.41 57.96 100.00 
100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00  
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Figure 2    Generational Mobility 
Model Number -1- -2- -3- -4- -5- -6- 
Variable 
Feelings of 
Mobility 
Feelings of 
Mobility 
Feelings of 
Mobility 
Feelings of 
Mobility 
Feelings of 
Mobility 
Feelings of 
Mobility 
1st Generation 0.328*** 0.375*** 0.353*** 0.351*** 0.358*** 0.170 
(0.067) (0.069) (0.069) (0.090) (0.096) (0.134) 
2nd Generation 0.048 0.062 0.087 0.121 0.132 0.006 
( 0.087) (0.089) (0.088) (0.121) (0.129) (0.147) 
3rd Generation -0.085 -0.090  -0.056 -0.008 0.051 0.038 
(0.061) (0.061) (0.062) (0.083) (0.093) (0.097) 
Political Views  -0.046*** -0.058*** -0.083*** -0.077*** -0.076*** 
(0.017) (0.017) (0.022) (0.024) (0.025) 
Education 0.029 0.004 0.004 0.019 
(0.019) (0.027) (0.030) (0.031) 
Sex (1=male) -0.078 0.012 0.010 0.005 
(0.048) (0.064) (0.071) (0.072) 
Age -0.114*** -0.124*** -0.135*** -0.122*** 
(0.020) (0.032) (0.035) 0.036 
Income 0.127*** 0.128*** 0.126** 
(0.043) (0.049) (0 .049) 
SEI  0.002 0.002 0.002 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Origin by HDI -0.017 0.076 
(0.026) (0.092) 
Origin by Region: N. America  -0.576 
(0.532) 
Origin by Region: West Europe -0.382 
(0.393) 
Origin by Region: East Europe -0.428 
(0.386) 
Origin by Region: Central America 0.003 
(0.321) 
Origin by Region: S. America 0.067 
(0.381) 
Origin by Region: Asia -0.061 
(0.343) 
Origin by Region: Africa -0.101 
(0.191) 
Constant 3.662***  3.844*** 4.289*** 4.093*** 4.146***  4.081*** 
(0.031) (0.070) (0.134) (0.191) (0.225) (0.243) 
Observations 1891 1837 1833 1086 884  884 
R-squared 0.015 0.022 0.042 0.045 0.046 0.053 
 
Parentheses indicate standard error              * p<0.10 **p<0.05 ***p<0.01 
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Generational Mobility Model 
  
-1- 
 
Regression one of the Generational Mobility model indicates that first generation 
immigrants have the strongest feelings of positive socioeconomic mobility, compared to the  
feelings of second, third, and the fourth-plus generation immigrants.  In this regression, only first 
generation immigrants have a statistically significant relationship to the mobility variable, 
indicating that when all other generations are held constant, first generation American 
immigrants believe they are more upwardly mobile than Americans whose families have two or 
more generations born in the United States.  The finding that the first generation perceives itself 
to be more mobile than any other generation was not unexpected and adds support to the existing 
literature on immigration.  The act of migration in and of itself suggests that immigrants perceive 
themselves as having a greater chance to achieve their economic goals and improve their lives by 
coming to the United States (Massey et al., 1993; Portes & Rumbaut, 2006).  As the generation 
that experiences the actual act of immigration, the first generation shows itself to most strongly 
believe in the possibility of upward mobility. 
The coefficients for the second and third generation, while not statistically significant, 
indicate that there is still a difference in feelings of mobility between all three generations in 
comparison to the fourth-plus generation.  Second generation immigrants exhibit feelings of 
upward mobility that are not nearly as strong as those felt by the first generation, suggesting that 
perceived upward mobility diminishes in the second generation. The third generation has a 
negative coefficient in this regression, but since it is not statistically significant, we can only 
conclude that the third generation does not consider itself to have the same feelings of potential 
upward mobility as the first generation, and are no different from the fourth-plus generation in 
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regards to perceptions of mobility. Overall, evaluating the generational relationship to mobility 
only explains a small portion (about two percent) of the overall variance in the feelings of 
mobility variable. 
-2- 
Regression two of the Generation Mobility model introduces and examines the effect of 
political ideology on perceptions of socioeconomic mobility.  With a negative, statistically 
significant coefficient in regression two, we can conclude that political ideology is not only 
important to understanding how people perceive their own mobility, but additionally as people 
become more liberal, their perceptions of possible upward mobility decrease in comparison to 
their more politically conservative counterparts.  Individuals with the strongest feelings of 
political conservatism also have the strongest feelings of the potential for positive mobility. The 
strength of the trend between liberal political ideology and perceived decreased socioeconomic 
mobility, however, does not mitigate the strength of the relationship between feelings of positive 
socioeconomic mobility and the first generation.  In this model, the beta coefficient for the first 
generation is 0.128 and the beta coefficient for political ideology is -0.063, which indicates that 
being part of the first generation more strongly predicts feelings of mobility over all other 
variables tested in regression two. The relationship between the first generation and positive 
mobility also remains statistically significant in this regression.  The explanatory power of 
regression two has increased from the first regression, but adding political ideology as a way of 
explaining feelings of mobility only slightly increases the explanatory power. 
-3- 
Regression three of the Generation Mobility model attempts to account for the effects of 
various demographic variables on feelings of mobility.  Regression three measures the effect of 
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education, age, and sex on the perceptions of individual feelings of mobility.  Of the three new 
variables introduced in this model only age has a statistically significant effect on feelings of 
mobility.  As the age of the respondent increases, their likelihood of perceiving themselves as 
upwardly mobile decreases.  This makes logical sense; the older an individual is, the less time 
they have to achieve upward mobility, and the less time they may have to work within or move 
up in a job, if they are even employed.  Those in the younger age brackets are more likely to 
perceive themselves as upwardly mobile since they may still occupy lower positions in the 
workforce, which lends the possibility of moving up within their given occupation. Additionally, 
younger people have more of their life to achieve some form of upward mobility than those who 
are higher in age. There is also potential for obtaining more education and increasing 
socioeconomic mobility through increased education for the younger cohorts. The beta 
coefficient for age in this regression is -0.130, which as strongest beta coefficient, indicating that 
age is a powerful determinant of feelings of mobility.   
Surprisingly, education has no real effect on perceptions of upward or downward 
socioeconomic mobility.  Despite evidence of increased income earning potential with increased 
time spent in school, there is no statistically significant relationship between increased time spent 
in school and increased feelings of upward mobility (Glick & Miller, 1956).If the education 
coefficient was statistically significant it would indicate that those with more education tend to 
perceive themselves as more upwardly mobile.   
The explanatory power of regression three is double that of regression two, indicating 
that the inclusion of demographic variables aids in explaining people’s perceptions of their 
socioeconomic mobility.  Political ideology remains a statistically significant predictor of 
perceptions of mobility, but compared to first generation and age, political ideology is less 
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strongly related feelings of mobility. The political ideology variable has a beta coefficient of -
0.079, which is higher than the previous regression, suggesting that when all else is held 
constant, political ideology as an explanatory variable is growing in importance. Although 
ideology is statistically significant, it remains less predictive of perceptions socioeconomic 
mobility than age or the first generation variables.  Finally, in returning to the variables deemed 
most significant in this overall study, the first generation still remains statistically significant and 
indicative of strong feelings of potential positive socioeconomic mobility.  The beta coefficient 
for the first generation is 0.121, which is slightly smaller than the beta coefficient of -0.130 for 
age.  With a 0.121 beta, being part of the first generation remains one of the strongest predictors 
of positive feelings of mobility. The diminishing belief in upward mobility in the second and 
third generations is a pattern that continues to be statistically insignificant. 
-4- 
Regression four of the Generation Mobility model introduces income and socioeconomic 
index variables.  Predictably, there is a statistically significant relationship between mobility and 
income.  As income increases, feelings of upward socioeconomic mobility also increase.  Like 
age, this is a logical trend; those who have more income are going to feel more mobile.  The 
security and opportunities afforded by excess income and savings are going to make individuals 
feel more mobile.  Higher income affords opportunities such as education, which although not 
statistically significant in this regression, still shows a trend towards higher feelings of mobility 
at higher levels of education.  Less measurable effects such as community networks and family 
and occupational associations at higher levels of income and socioeconomic index are also 
reasons for why those occupying higher income levels might feel more mobile.  The beta 
coefficient for income in this regression is 0.098, and compared to the other betas of statistically 
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significant variables such as age, political ideology, and first generation, income is the weakest 
predictor of feelings of mobility. 
Socioeconomic index does not show a statistically significant effect on feelings of 
mobility.  This is surprising because the SEIs lack of effect indicates that occupation may have 
nothing to do with how an individual feels about their potential for mobility.  An implied lack of 
effect on feelings of mobility by the SEI variable suggests that those who work low prestige jobs, 
have low incomes, and have lower levels of education do not perceive themselves as having low 
or high potential for upward mobility.  Structural barriers to socioeconomic advancement are not 
perceived to be important. Additionally, because SEI is an aggregate measure of education, 
income, and occupational prestige, it is possible the lack of effect SEI has on feelings of mobility 
is due to the previously introduced and independent measures of education and income.   
The first generation continues to be a strong predictor of whether or not someone will 
have high feelings of mobility when all other variables are held constant.  Feelings of upward 
mobility in the second generation continue to be diminished, and the third generation also 
continues to perceive itself as having less potential for upward mobility compared to the first and 
second generations.  The previously discussed relationships between political ideology and 
feelings of mobility; and age and feelings of mobility also remain statistically significant.  The 
beta coefficients for the first generation and age are almost exactly the same in terms of variable 
strength;0.121 and -0.122 respectively, which indicates that in this regression, age and first 
generation status are equally predictive of feelings of mobility.  For age, the older a respondent 
is, the more likely they are to perceive themselves as not being upwardly mobile.  The first 
generation continues to have strong perceptions of upward mobility.  The strength of political 
ideology in predicting feelings of mobility continues to grow with each successive regression 
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and has a beta coefficient of -0.115 in this regression.  The more conservative a respondent, the 
more likely they are to feel as if they have the opportunity to move up in a socioeconomic 
capacity continues to be true as the regressions progress through the model.  The explanatory 
power of regression four is also increased from the previous regression, although the number of 
observations is reduced.  A loss of observations in this regression likely comes from respondents 
who chose not to answer questions on income.  Non-responses could be due to a variety reasons, 
perhaps those who did not respond were not comfortable with how they were paid or with the 
amount they made.  Observations lost in this regression are probably not significantly different 
from those that did respond to questions regarding their income. 
-5- 
Regression five measures the effect of a respondent’s country of origin as divided up by 
that country’s human development index rating.  This regression is especially useful in 
understanding the relationship between first generation, their country of origin, and their 
relationship with socioeconomic mobility.  The expected effect within this regression would be 
that respondents from countries with low human development index scores would display higher 
levels of perceived socioeconomic mobility since migration to the US is typically done with a 
goal of increasing lifestyle and socioeconomic mobility.  This expected result, however, is not 
seen and first generational status and age over all other variables continue to be the best 
predictors of feelings of mobility. 
The first generation and age continue to exhibit similar strengths within this regression, 
with beta coefficients of 0.131 for the first generation and -0.132 for age. It should also be noted 
that the strength of age and first generational status within the overall Generational Mobility 
model continues to grow with each successive regression.  The original trend exhibited by the 
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second and third generations of decreased perceptions of upward mobility continues to be 
expressed, although as was the case in the first regression, second and third generations do not 
show statistically significant relationships to feelings of perceived mobility.  Relationships to 
mobility in the income and political ideology variables continue to remain statistically significant 
and continue to express the same directional relationship to the feelings of mobility variable as 
they did in previous regressions.  The beta coefficient for political ideology in this regression is -
0.107, which is slightly decreased from the regression four and suggests that the introduction of a 
country of origin variable slightly mitigates the strength of political ideology when considering a 
person’s feelings of mobility.  Income’s beta coefficient of 0.098 is unchanged by the 
introduction of the first country of origin variable and continues to be the weakest variable in 
comparison to the other statistically significant variables (age, first generational status, and 
political ideology).  Aside from adding some predictive power to the model, regression five 
really does not introduce any variables that have a significant effect on those measured 
previously.  Regression five loses observations, probably due in part to the way the country of 
origin variable was created.  The respondents lost in this regression are likely from the fourth-
plus generation and probably did not know or answer what country or region of origin their 
families were from.   
-6- 
Regression six also examines the effect of country of origin on the respondent’s feelings 
of mobility.  Just as was expected in regression five, country of origin is most likely to affect first 
generation immigrants.  In regression five, this did not occur; however, in regression six the 
introduction of the country of origin variable as divided by world region completely mitigates the 
relationship between feelings of mobility and first generation immigrants.   The mitigation of this 
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relationship is seen from the loss of statistical significance in the first generation coefficient and 
the drop in the first generation’s beta coefficient from 0.131 to 0.062.  In addition to lessening 
the effect of first generational status on feelings of mobility, the introduction of the world region 
of origin variable also significantly reduces the effect of political ideology on feelings of 
mobility.  Reduction in the effects of first generational status and political ideology suggests two 
particularly interesting findings: first, immigrants who migrate to the United States and 
constitute the first generation bring with them feelings of mobility strongly shaped by their 
countries and regions of origin.  Second, the substantial reduction in the strength of political 
ideology also indicates that immigrants’ home countries and regions strongly shape political 
ideologies.  Although statistical significance remains, the beta coefficient for political ideology is 
also drastically reduced in this regression to -0.014, down from -0.107 in regression five.  Age 
also experiences a slight reduction in strength but income does not, and both variables remain 
statistically significant.  Income’s strength in significance in the overall model is very stable with 
a beta coefficient of 0.096 for regression six.    
Individual regions of origin on their own do not have a statistically significant effect on 
feelings of mobility; however, despite the lack of statistical significance, an examination of the 
strength of individual regions of origin on feelings of mobility is warranted.  Immigrants from 
North America (excluding the US), Western Europe, and Eastern Europe are more likely to 
express decreased feelings in potential for upward mobility compared to those whose country of 
origin is the United States, South or Central America, Asia, and Africa.  Western Europeans also 
exhibit the strongest feelings about mobility—a decreased potential for upward mobility—over 
all other regions of origin.  Immigrants from Central America, South America, Asia, and Africa 
all express feelings of an increased potential for upward mobility compared to those whose 
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country or region of origin is the United States, North America, and West or East Europe.  Of 
those regions of origin that express increased feelings of upward mobility, immigrants from 
Africa express the strongest feelings, with immigrants from South and Central American 
expressing equally strong feelings for upward mobility. 
Assistance Attitudes Model 
The Assistance Attitudes model seeks to explain how attitudes about social assistance are shaped 
and whether or not feelings of mobility have a significant effect on assistance attitudes.  
Specifically, the Assistance Attitudes model in Figure 3 examines the potential of feelings of 
mobility acting as a variable that mediates the relationship between generation and assistance 
attitudes.  As was the case in the Generational Mobility model, much of the statistical analysis is 
based on beta coefficient comparisons.  Please see Appendix C for a table of the beta coefficients 
for the Assistance Attitudes model.  
-1- 
Regression one of the Assistance Attitudes model examines the difference in support for social 
assistance programs between first, second, and third generation immigrants.  All three 
generations show decreased support for social assistance programs in comparison to the fourth-
plus generation.  The second generation does not exhibit statistically significant negative feelings 
about social assistance in the United States; however, the first and third generations do exhibit 
negative feelings.  As generation changes from first to second and from second to third, strength 
in negative feelings about social assistance become stronger. The beta coefficient for the third 
generation is -0.073 and is the largest beta coefficient for this regression.  The finding that 
individuals who have third generation status oppose social assistance programs more strongly  
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Figure 3   Social Assistance Attitudes 
 
Model Number -1- -2- -3- -4- -5- -6- -7- 
1st Generation  -0.191* -0.177  -0.293** -0.306** -0.447** -0.405**  -0.658*** 
(0.108) (0.135) (0 .132) (0.132) (0.176) (0.180) (0.230) 
2nd Generation -0.068 0.002 -0.070 -0.051 -0.173  -0.167 -0.435* 
(0.129) (0.159) (0.155) (0.154) (0.217) (0.225) (0.261) 
3rd Generation -0.244*** -0.233** -0.237** -0.165  -0.047 0.097 0.049 
(0.094) (0.118) (0.114) (0.114) (0.159) (0.170) (0.176) 
Feelings of Mobility -0.143*** -0.113*** -0.115*** -0.131** -0.097  -0.099 
(0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.055)  (0.060) (0.060) 
Political Views   0.234*** 0.237*** 0.280***  0.261*** 0.256*** 
(0.031) (0.031) (0.041) (0.045) (0 .045) 
Education -0.081** -0.047  -0.020 -0.007 
(0.034) (0.048) (0.052) (0.054) 
Sex (1=male) 0.278*** 0.092 0.078 0.097 
(0.086) (0.117) (0.127) (0.127) 
Age  -0.066*  -0.061 -0.046 -0.013 
(0.037) (0.056) (0.062) (0.063) 
Income -0.071 -0.056 -0.0650 
(0.080) (0.087) (0.086) 
SEI (Socioeconomic Index)  -0.012** -0.010* -0.011* 
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006) 
Origin by HDI -0.105** 0.048 
(0.045) (0.171) 
Origin by Region: N. America 0.555 
(0.961) 
Origin by Region: West Europe -0.315 
(0.721) 
Origin by Region: East Europe -0.087 
(0.722) 
Origin by Region: Central America 0.429 
(0.597) 
Origin by Region: S. America 0.254 
(0.716) 
Origin by Region: Asia 0.108 
(0.628) 
Origin by Region: Africa 0.576* 
(0.323) 
Constant 7.226*** 7.739***  6.728*** 6.728*** 6.969***  7.079*** 6.613*** 
(0.046) (0.166) (0.303) (0.303) (0.418) (0.472) (0.490) 
Observations 1319 880 869 869 510 427  427 
R-squared  0.007 0.019 0.103 0.103 0.141 0.128 0.158 
Parentheses indicate standard error   * p<0.10 **p<0.05 ***p<0.01 
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than those who are part of the first generation is an unexpected finding.   This finding suggests 
that the original hypothesis driving this paper, that first generation immigrants will show lower 
support for social assistance compared to the second and third generations, may be entirely 
incorrect.  The explanatory power of regression one in the Assistance Attitudes is very low, 
indicating that generation alone does not explain most of the variance within the assistance 
attitudes variable. 
-2- 
 The introduction of the mobility variable is vital to understanding whether or not 
perceptions of mobility have a mediating effect on support attitudes about social assistance 
programs.  Regression two examines the effect feelings of mobility have on attitudes about social 
assistance programs.  The feelings of mobility variable is statistically significant in this 
regression and also has the strongest beta coefficient over all the generation variables.  High 
feelings of potential upward mobility generally suggest that the respondent will show low to no 
support for social assistance programs while low feelings of potential upward mobility indicate 
that a respondent will show strong support for assistance programs.   
Third generational status also remains a statistically significant predictor of low support 
for social assistance but with a beta coefficient of -0.068, being part of the third generation does 
not predict low support for social assistance as strongly as perceptions of high socioeconomic 
mobility potential do in this regression.  The first and second generations are statistically 
insignificant and negative in this regression, indicating that inclusion in the first or second 
generation may mean a respondent is going to show low support for social assistance.   However, 
when considering the attitudes about social assistance of a first or second generation immigrant, 
the effects of generation are likely through feelings of mobility.   
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-3- 
The third regression in the Assistance Attitudes model examines the effect of political 
views on feelings about social assistance.  Not surprisingly, the more liberal a respondent, the 
more likely they are to have positive attitudes about the presence of programs and show support 
for an increase in funding for social assistance programs. Political ideology is often reflective of 
core values; therefore, it is logical that liberal respondents would more strongly support 
assistance because liberal political ideology places an emphasis on the core value of 
egalitarianism. 
Introducing political ideology as a control variable in this regression also yielded 
unexpected results.  Feelings of mobility significantly decreased in predictive power, with the 
beta coefficient dropping to -0.090, but still suggesting that high feelings of upward mobility 
correspond to low support for social assistance.  Feelings of mobility as a variable did remain 
statistically significant in the regression, as did the first and third generation variables.  By 
introducing political ideology and then holding it constant, the first and third generations prove 
to also be predictive of attitudes about social assistance.  The first generation has a beta 
coefficient of -0.074 and the third generation has a beta coefficient of -0.070, neither of which is 
as strongly predictive of attitudes compared to political ideology and mobility, but are growing 
in predictive strength between regressions two and three.  First and third generation status 
appears to be important to determining whether or not a person is willing to support social 
assistance programs.  The first and third generations are almost equal in predictive strength that a 
respondent who is either first or third generation will likely show low support for social 
assistance programs overall.  Additionally, regression three helps to support the idea that first 
generation immigrants are less likely to support social assistance programs; however, it 
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contradicts the argument that support will be shown for programs by the second and third 
generations.   Finally, the overall explanatory power of regression three is significantly stronger 
compared to the first two regressions.     
-4- 
 Regression four introduces demographic variables to the Assistance Attitudes model.  
Education, sex, and age are added with all three having a statistically significant effect on 
attitudes about social assistance.  As the number of years spent in school increase, the likelihood 
that a respondent will display low support for social assistance programs also increases.  
Respondents with lower levels of education tend to support social assistance programs more, all 
else held constant.  Sex also appears to play a role in determining attitudes about social 
assistance.  Men tend to show more support than women for social assistance programs.  In terms 
of age, the older a respondent is, the less likely they are to show support for social assistance.  
The younger the respondent, the more likely they are to support increasing spending for social 
assistance.  First generation status and political ideology are also statistically significant in 
regression four with the first generation continuing to exhibit negative attitudes towards social 
assistance.  Political ideology continues to be the strongest predictor of support or lack of support 
for social assistance with a beta coefficient of 0.0254.  Sex is the next strongest predictor of 
support for assistance, with education and first generation status both showing equal strength in 
indicating whether or not someone will show support for assistance.  Age is least predictive of 
support. The introduction of demographic variables did not increase the explanatory power of 
regression four. 
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-5- 
 Regression five introduces income and socioeconomic index variables to the Assistance 
Attitudes model.  As the literature does not agree on the ways in which income can affect 
attitudes about assistance, the results of regression five are particularly enlightening.  Income as 
an indicator of attitudes about social assistance suggest that those at low incomes tend to be more 
supportive of social assistance, while those in the high income brackets are less supportive of 
assistance programs.  We cannot conclude, however, whether or not income has a significant role 
in determining attitudes about social assistance programs because the variable does not have 
statistical significance in this regression.  Socioeconomic index is statistically significant in this 
regression which indicates that all variables held constant, those with a high socioeconomic 
index show low levels of support for assistance programs.  Combined high levels of education, 
income, and occupational prestige all suggest that a respondent will not support strong social 
assistance programs or increased spending for these programs.  Socioeconomic index is the 
weakest predictor of support for programs of the statistically significant variables within 
regression five. 
 Sex, age, and education are no longer statistically significant and do not predict attitudes 
about social assistance programs.  Feelings of mobility remain statistically significant in 
regression five and have a beta coefficient of -0.100.  The first generation is also statistically 
significant and has similar predictive strength to feelings of mobility with a beta coefficient of -
0.111.  Despite several more control variables being added to the regression, feelings of mobility 
and first generation status continue to have an effect on attitudes about social assistance.  
Compared to the second, third generations and the fourth-plus generation, being part of the first 
generation still suggests that a respondent will not strongly support assistance programs.  
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Additionally, feelings of strong upward mobility are also still indicative of low support for social 
assistance.  Political ideology remains the strongest variable and predictor of support or lack of 
support for various forms of social assistance and grows in predictive power with each 
successive regression; in regression five, political ideology has a beta coefficient of 0.295.  The 
explanatory power of regression five is also increased, although there is a significant drop in 
observations between regression four and regression five, likely due to non-responses to 
questions of income.   
-6- 
 In regression six, the effect of country of origin on attitudes about assistance is being 
measured.  Country of origin is divided by the human development index to see if coming from a 
country of low or high development has any effect on how an immigrant may feel about social 
assistance in the United States.  Introducing country of origin does have a statistically significant 
effect on attitudes and the more developed country one originates from, the less likely they are to 
support social assistance programs in the United States.  First generation status, political 
ideology, and socioeconomic index also continue to have a statistically significant effect on 
attitudes about social assistance.  In terms of predictive strength, country of origin has a beta 
coefficient of-0.111, with political ideology the only variable being more predictive of attitudes 
regarding social assistance.  Socioeconomic index also continues to predict whether a respondent 
will show or not show support for assistance programs, although overall the predictive power of 
socioeconomic index is weak compared to all other significant variables.  Finally, the loss of 
statistical significance by the feelings of mobility variable is notable.  Mobility does not mitigate 
the relationship between attitudes about assistance and variables such as first generation status, 
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political ideology, socioeconomic index, and country of origin by development index. Feelings 
of upward mobility are no longer predictive of low support for social assistance.   
Belonging to the first generation also has a predictive power similar to country of origin 
and has a beta coefficient of -0.109, which is unexpected.  Just as introducing country of origin 
variables in regressions five and six of the Generational Mobility model helped to mediate the 
first generation as a variable, the expected result in regression six of the Assistance Attitudes 
would have been a mediation of the first generation’s predictive power.  Political and economic 
socialization from a home country was expected to play a significant role in how a first 
generation immigrant feels about social assistance programs, but it does not appear to play as 
significant a role as expected.  Since the first generation continues to be important, assistance 
attitudes of the first generation are not determined entirely by the countries from which 
immigrants migrate. As the number of observations between regressions five and six decrease, 
the explanatory power of regression six decreases as well.    
-7- 
The seventh regression introduces the second country of origin variable, country of origin 
by region.  In regression seven neither country of origin by region nor country of origin by 
human development index has a statistically significant effect on a respondent’s attitude 
regarding social assistance, with the exception of one region.  Immigrants from Africa tend to 
support social assistance programs more strongly than respondents for other regions of the world 
and from the US. We would expect to find some effect by country of origin in either of its forms, 
but attitudes about social assistance appear to be shaped by a variety of variables other than 
geographical origin, with the exception of immigrants from Africa.  As a region of origin, Africa 
has a beta coefficient of 0.138, and has some predictive power when considering whether or not 
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a first, second, or third generation immigrant will support social assistance, although African 
origin is not as strong in predictive power compared to first generation status and political 
ideology. 
First generation status also continues to be statistically significant and strongly predictive 
of low support for social assistance when all other variables are held constant.  The first 
generation has a beta coefficient of -0.177 and has greater predictive power than region of origin.  
Regardless of where an immigrant or their parents or grandparents originate from, first 
generation immigrants over all others are not as supportive of social assistance programs.  
Surprisingly, the second generation has statistical significance in regression seven suggesting 
that by holding region of origin constant, second generation immigrants emerge to have attitudes 
about social assistance.  Second generation immigrants also tend to have low support for social 
assistance, but their support is not as low as that expressed by the first generation.  Additionally, 
the second generation has significantly less predictive power than the first generation, with a beta 
coefficient of -0.092.Socioeconomic index is still statistically significant in regression seven, and 
those with a higher socioeconomic index do not support social assistance programs as strongly as 
those who have a low socioeconomic index.  Socioeconomic index does not have strong 
predictive power and of the statistically significant variables in regression seven, socioeconomic 
index is the least predictive of attitudes expressing support or lack of support for social 
assistance programs.  Finally, political ideology remains the strongest predictor of whether or not 
someone will support social assistance.  The explanatory power of regression seven is increased 
from regression six and no respondents are lost between regression six and regression seven. 
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Discussion and Conclusion 
The primary objective of this study was to examine the relationship between different immigrant 
generations, their perceptions of their own socioeconomic mobility, and the affect those 
perceptions have on attitudes about social assistance.  Perceptions of mobility and assistance 
attitudes are reflections of core values which determine an individual’s perception of their 
mobility and what their assistance attitudes will be.  Hypothesis1 posited that there were 
significant differences in perceptions of mobility between generations, and that the first 
generation would perceive itself as being more mobile than the second, third, and fourth-plus 
generations.  On the topic of the first generation, hypothesis1 was correct: the first generation 
does perceive itself to be more upwardly mobile than all other generations and native born 
Americans.  There was no significant difference between second generation immigrants, third 
generation immigrants and everyone else in their feelings of mobility. 
After accounting for the effects of an individual’s region of origin, the first generation 
was no longer an important predictor of feelings of mobility.  This finding suggests that while a 
first generation immigrant’s perceptions of their own socioeconomic mobility may be high 
compared to all other generations and individuals, their country or region of origin plays a 
significant role in shaping their perceptions of mobility.  Perceptions of mobility are strongly tied 
to the core value of economic individualism—arguably one of the most is strongly held 
American values.  Since immigrants come to the United States with powerful feelings of 
individualism this suggests that in the second and third generation, individualism as a core value 
may not be cultivated as strongly.  Since regional origin variables mitigate the relationship 
between the first generation and feelings of mobility, we can conclude that first generation 
immigrants do not come to the US having shed their entire set of core values.  Economic 
individualism appears to be a core value that is shaped prior to an immigrant’s migration to the 
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United States.  First generation immigrants may actually care more about the quintessentially 
American value of economic individualism than native born Americans.  
 Political ideology is also a strong predictor of feelings of mobility; however, political 
ideology may also be a variable that is indicative of a person’s core values and beliefs. Values 
are frequently packaged by political elites into ideological categories meant for consumption by 
the greater public, often reflecting a core set of beliefs and ideas neatly parceled on to one side or 
the other of the political spectrum (Feldman, 1988).   Since conservatives view themselves as 
having greater socioeconomic mobility than liberals, conservatives may just be reflecting 
economic individualism as one of their more strongly held core values, not their political 
ideology. Finally, in adding region of origin to the Generational Mobility model, political 
ideology is substantially reduced in predictive strength.  This indicates that when individuals 
who are from the same region and who may share similar core values are controlled for, political 
ideology becomes much less important to understanding perceptions of socioeconomic mobility.  
People utilize and self-place on the ideological spectrum because ideological labels reflect core 
values (Feldman, 2003).  This lessens the importance of political ideology as explanatory of 
feelings of mobility.   
 Income is one of the most consistent predictors of feelings of mobility.  Those with high 
incomes feel that they have more potential for upward mobility than those with low incomes.  
Having a high income legitimates economic individualism as a core value. Although there are 
numerous social and structural barriers to earning a high income, a topic which is outside the 
purview of this study, those with high incomes may believe more strongly in the value of 
economic individualism because their income is evidence of economic individualism at work. 
Economic individualism does not dictate whether or not an individual has a high or low income, 
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however, those with high incomes may perceive their level of income to be a manifestation of 
economic individualism.   
 A perception of socioeconomic mobility is a reflection of a core value and is specifically 
a reflection of economic individualism as a value (Feldman, 2003).  First generation immigrants 
hold more strongly economic individualism as a core value over all other types of respondents.  
For the first generation, core values are shaped in their home countries, though this is not to say 
that all cultures in the world value economic individualism in ways similar to or the same as 
Americans.  If individualism is a strong value in immigrants prior to migration, additional 
research on how individualism becomes a core value in cultures that may not cultivate it as 
strongly as in the United States could be enlightening.  Perhaps the discourses of American 
economic individualism have become transnational, proliferating to many corners of the world 
and   offering immigrants who migrate to the United States a value upon which to base their 
migration decision. 
 The second primary objective of this study was to test whether or not generational 
perceptions of mobility affect attitudes regarding social assistance, and specifically that 
perceptions of upward mobility indicate low support for social assistance.  Mobility perceptions 
do differ by generation, and hypothesis2 argues that these perceptions have an effect on whether 
or not a person is willing to support social assistance programs.  There is a generational effect on 
assistance attitudes; overall, the first generation tends to be less supportive of social assistance 
programs.  We know that the first generation does perceive itself to be more upwardly mobile 
than all other respondents; therefore it would appear that perceptions of socioeconomic mobility 
may account for the variation in assistance attitudes and that first generation immigrants’ 
perceptions of upward mobility lead them to show low support for social assistance.  When 
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mobility is introduced as an explanatory variable, it does have a statistically significant effect on 
assistance attitudes, however, that effect disappears when the region of origin variables are 
introduced.  The first generation continues to have an effect on attitudes regarding social 
assistance, unmitigated by any of the other explanatory variables. Finally, political ideology also 
affects assistance attitudes, but as argued about the role of political ideology on feelings of 
mobility, ideology frequently reflects core values and thus is not an important factor in 
understanding how assistance attitudes are shaped. 
 The apparent lack of effect by mobility on assistance attitudes is due to the region of 
origin variables, which may be because perceptions of mobility are already imbedded in the first 
generation as part of the core value of individualism.  Alternatively, mobility’s explanatory 
power may be mitigated because other core values in different regions and countries do not 
encourage strong social assistance programs.  Although individualism allows for some support of 
assistance when a person’s need is perceived to be a result of circumstances beyond their control, 
other core values have been studied and are not mutually exclusive from individualism (Feldman 
& Steenbergen, 2001).  The first generation’s relative low support for social assistance indicates 
that first generation immigrants may hold the humanitarian value as part of their core set of 
values that include economic individualism. Unless the first generation perceives individuals as 
not responsible for their own need for assistance—which humanitarians generally do not, they 
will not support social assistance.   
 Since we do not see the second and third generation affecting mobility and assistance 
attitudes, additional research on the second and third generations would clarify which and if core 
values shape mobility feelings and assistance attitudes in these generations.  Additionally, there 
is extensive discussion on the importance of family and social networks, and actual assistance 
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utilization in the literature review as it pertains to the second and successive generations.  
Exploring networks and utilization of social assistance would be an area of important research 
not just for the second and third generations, but also for the first generation.  Unfortunately, this 
study does not directly test core values, although feelings of mobility relate strongly to 
individualism, and other core values are often invoked as explanations for high or low support 
for assistance programs.  This study would be strengthened if a measure directly related to 
individualism, humanitarianism, and egalitarianism were tested as part of the explanatory 
variables examined in both the Generational Mobility model and the Assistance Attitudes model.   
 The first generation has a core set of values that are shaped prior to migrating to the 
United States.  For the first generation, their attitudes and perceptions are strongly shaped by 
core beliefs and values that they retain from their country of origin, which contribute to their 
political and economic opinions and perceptions.  Economic individualism and humanitarianism 
are core values held by much of the first generation.  We cannot conclude entirely that second 
and third generation immigrants are also shaped by core beliefs and values, nor which core 
beliefs and values these may be.  However, the patterns observed in this study indicate that 
variables beyond feelings of mobility, political ideology, demographics, and regions of family 
origin contribute to perceptions of socioeconomic mobility and attitudes about social assistance 
in the second and third generations.  
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Appendix A: Variables 
Region of Origin by HDI uses the 2006 GSS ETHNIC question “from what countries or part of 
the world did your ancestors come?”  The intention of region of origin by HDI was to measure 
the effect of origin when it was divided by Human Development Index to see if levels of 
development affected perceptions of mobility and assistance attitudes.  The HDI is “a summary 
measure of human development. It measures the average achievements in a country in three 
basic dimensions of human development: a long and healthy life, access to knowledge and a 
decent standard of living” (United Nations Development Program, 2010).  There are four levels 
of development: very high development, high development, medium development, low 
development.  The following countries and regions fall into each of the four HDI categories: 
Very high development: Austria, French Canada, Other Canada, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, 
England and Wales, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, 
Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Scotland, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Portugal, Belgium, Non-
Spanish West Indies 
High Development: Mexico, Russia, Lithuania, Yugoslavia, Romania, Arabic speaking 
Countries, Other Spanish speaking countries, Other Asian Countries, Other European Countries 
Medium Development: China, Philippines, West Indies, India 
Low Development: Africa  
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The United States, those with Native American heritage, and those from Puerto Rico were coded 
into a 0 category since measuring the origin of immigrants from other countries was the intended 
use of  this variable. 
The Human Development Index ranks almost every single country in the world, a rank between 
1 and 42 indicates very high development, a rank between 43 and 85 indicates high development, 
a rank between 86 and 127 indicates medium development, and a rank between 128 and 169 
indicates low development.  Since many of the categories available within the original ETHNIC 
variable are actual regional and language groupings, categorizing these large groupings of 
countries was slightly problematic.  For example, Africa is categorized as having low 
development.  This categorization was made based on the average development ranking of every 
single country in Africa.  The average HDI ranking of all countries in Africa was between 128 
and 169.  This same methodology was used to find the HDI categorization for Other Asian 
countries, Other European countries, etc.  This measure is imperfect because it’s an average of 
HDI rankings for many categories within the ETHNIC variable. 
Origin by Region is a variable that also uses ETHNIC from the 2006 GSS.  This variable places 
each region or country into one of eight world regions: North America, West Europe, East 
Europe, Central America, South America, Asia, and the United States.  The imperfection of 
origin by region as a variable is not just in the groupings of countries and regions into eight 
regions, but additionally that geographical regions cannot account for the vast difference in 
people around the world.  Eight regions do not necessarily explain the commonalities and 
differences between people in the world.  Even within a single country, there are regional 
differences between people which may shape their political attitudes and perceptions of mobility. 
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Age of the respondent is broken into five categories: 18-24, 25-34, 35-49, 50-64, 65+ 
Education is the highest year of school completed by the respondent.  There are five available 
categories: some high school, high school graduate, some college, college graduate, and post 
college. 
Income categories were created based on the respondent’s income with the five available 
categories created according to the 2006 income tax brackets: $0-$6395.625, $7816.875-
$25582.5, $31237.5-$68220, $79590-$154000, $159292.3+  
SEI or socioeconomic index is an aggregate measure of education, income, and occupational 
prestige.  There are ten categories of SEI scores, with scores ranging from 10.1-99.7.  Categories 
are in increments of nine: 10.0-19.9, 20.0-29.9, 30.0-398.9, 40.0-49.9, 50.0-59.9, 60.0-69.9, 
70.0-79.9, 80.0-89.9, 90.0-99.7   
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Appendix B: Beta Coefficients for Generational Mobility 
 
 
Generational Mobility Model (beta coefficients) 
 
-1- -2- -3- -4- -5- -6- 
1st Generation 0.114*** 0.128*** 0.121*** 0.121*** 0.131*** 0.062 
2nd Generation 0.013 0.016 0.023 0.031 0.035 0.002 
3rd Generation -0.032 -0.035 -0.022 -0.003 0.019 0.014 
Political Views (1=Conservative 7=Liberal) -0.063*** -0.079*** -0.115*** -0.107*** -0.014*** 
Education 0.035 0.005 0.005 0.023 
Sex (1=male) -0.037 0.006 0.005 0.002 
Age (18-24, 25-34, 35-49, 50-64, 65+) -0.130*** -0.122*** -0.132*** -0.120*** 
Income 0.098*** 0.098*** 0.096** 
SEI (Socioeconomic Index) 0.020 0.022 0.020 
Country of Origin by Human Development Index -0.022 0.098 
Country of Origin by Region: N. America -0.053 
Country of Origin by Region: West Europe -0.184 
Country of Origin by Region: East Europe -0.117 
Country of Origin by Region: Central America 0.001 
Country of Origin by Region: S. America 0.011 
Country of Origin by Region: Asia -0.011 
Country of Origin by Region: Africa -0.030 
*p<0.10  **p<0.05  ***p<0.01 on variable 
coefficient 
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Appendix C: Beta Coefficients for Assistance Attitudes 
 
Assistance Attitudes (beta coefficients)  
-1- -2- -3- -4- -5- -6- -7- 
1st Generation -0.049* -0.045 -0.074**  -0.078** -0.111** -0.109** -0.177*** 
2nd Generation -0.015 0.000 -0.015 -0.011 -0.034 -0.035 -0.092* 
3rd Generation  -0.073*** -0.068** -0.070** -0.049 -0.013 0.028 0.014 
Feelings of Mobility -0.113*** -0.090*** -0.091 -0.100** -0.075 -0.077 
Political Views  0.251*** 0.254*** 0.295*** 0.276*** 0.270*** 
Education -0.078** -0.044 -0.019  -0.007 
Sex (1=male) 0.104*** 0.034 0.030 0.037 
Age  -0.058* -0.047 -0.036 -0.010 
Income -0.042 -0.033 -0.038 
SEI (Socioeconomic Index) -0.094** -0.085* -0.089* 
Origin by HDI -0.111** 0.051 
Region: N. America 0.041 
Region: West Europe -0.119 
Region: East Europe -0.017 
Region: Central America 0.100 
Region: S.  America 0.029 
Region: Asia 0.016 
Region: Africa 0.138* 
*p<0.10  **p<0.05  ***p<0.01 on 
variable coefficient 
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